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Nuclear power faces an uncertain future in Sweden. Major political parties, including the Green party of
the coalition-government have recently strongly advocated for a policy to decommission the Swedish
nuclear ﬂeet prematurely. Here we examine the environmental, health and (to a lesser extent) economic
impacts of implementing such a plan. The process has already been started through the early shutdown
of the Barsebäck plant. We estimate that the political decision to shut down Barsebäck has resulted in
2400 avoidable energy-production-related deaths and an increase in global CO2 emissions of 95 mil-
lion tonnes to date (October 2014). The Swedish reactor ﬂeet as a whole has reached just past its halfway
point of production, and has a remaining potential production of up to 2100 TWh. The reactors have the
potential of preventing 1.9–2.1 gigatonnes of future CO2-emissions if allowed to operate their full life-
spans. The potential for future prevention of energy-related-deaths is 50,000–60,000. We estimate an
800 billion SEK (120 billion USD) lower-bound estimate for the lost tax revenue from an early phase-out
policy. In sum, the evidence shows that implementing a ‘nuclear-free’ policy for Sweden (or countries in
a similar situation) would constitute a highly retrograde step for climate, health and economic protec-
tion.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Human industrial and agricultural activity is the principal cause
of changes in the Earth's atmospheric composition of long-lived
greenhouse gases, mainly carbon dioxide (CO2), and will cause
ongoing climate change over the 21st century and beyond (Han-
sen, 2013). More than 190 nations have agreed on the need to limit
fossil-fuel emissions to mitigate anthropogenic climate change as
formalized in the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCC, 2014). However, the competing global demand for low-r Ltd. This is an open access article
vägen 1, 752 37 Uppsala,
vist).cost and reliable energy and electricity to fuel the rapid economic
development of countries like China and India has led to a large
recent expansion of energy production capacity based pre-
dominantly on fossil fuels. Because of this need for energy and
economic growth in developing countries, coupled to the lack of
progress on decarbonization in most developed nations, human-
caused greenhouse-gas emissions continue to increase, even
though the threat of climate change from the burning of fossil
fuels is widely recognized (Boden and Andres, 2012).
Sweden (along with a few others nations such as France) stands
out as an exception to this trend, having largely eliminated its
dependence of fossil fuels for electricity production during the
1970s to 1990s via a large-scale deployment of nuclear energy (oil-
and gas-based transport fuels remains a problem, hydropower wasunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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several Swedish political parties, most prominently represented in
the current Swedish government by Green-party politician Ms. Åsa
Romson (who holds the position of minister for the environment
and climate) has promoted the urgent phase-out of the Swedish
nuclear program. This is a primary objective of the Swedish Green
party, with passive or active support from the Left and Center
parties (with the position of the dominant Social Democrat party
highly unclear). The Green-party, currently in a coalition govern-
ment with the Social democrats, has promised that at least two
reactors are to be shutdown prematurely in the next mandate
period (2014–2018), with other reactors soon to follow. According
to their announcements, this is to be accomplished by raising taxes
on nuclear power production to the point where continued op-
eration of the existing plants will become economically unviable
(Dagens Nyheter, 2014).
What impact might this decision have—if carried to fruition—
on Sweden's future environmental standing? To tackle this timely
policy-relevant question, we ﬁrst quantify the impact on global
greenhouse gas emissions that the Swedish nuclear program has
had to date, and then calculate what impact the proposed phase-
out decisions will have future emissions. In addition, we use
available mortality statistics for various electricity sources to es-
timate the impact on energy-related deaths. Our study is carried
out in detail on a reactor-by-reactor basis and follows the general
approach given in Kharecha and Hansen (2013). The hope is that
by providing an objective assessment of the real-world impact of
this announced policy, this study will help to better inform re-
sponsible politicians of the speciﬁc climate and health impacts of
political decisions regarding the Swedish nuclear ﬂeet.
Commercial light-water reactor (LWR) technology was origin-
ally developed and deployed in Sweden to increase energy in-
dependence (primarily by reducing foreign oil imports) and to
supply the increasing electricity and energy demand while pro-
tecting remaining major Swedish rivers from hydropower in-
stallations (Forsgren, 1994). The LWR program in Sweden started1
with the grid-connection of the Oskarshamn-1 (O1) reactor in
1972, and by 1986 half of the electrical output of the country came
from nuclear power plants. The active reactor ﬂeet consists of 10
reactors with a combined capacity of 10 GWe at three nuclear
power plants: Oskarshamn, Forsmark and Ringhals. In addition,
the Barsebäck nuclear plant with two reactors (600 MWe each)
has been shutdown prematurely due political decisions, but the
reactor units at the plant have not yet been dismantled. The option
of restarting the two reactors at the Barsebäck plant is considered
in this study. The active nuclear ﬂeet typically produces 60–
70 TWh/y, making up 43–47% of the total electricity production of
the country. The decommissioned Barsebäck units could poten-
tially add an additional ∼10 TWh/y.
The Swedish naming convention for reactors use the ﬁrst letter
of the plant name and a numeral corresponding to the chron-
ological reactor start of construction; the reactors are abbreviated
B1–B2, O1–O3, F1–F3 and R1–R4. The current reactor ﬂeet and its
age proﬁle are summarized in Table 1. The naming convention
used for different types of reactors in the study is taken directly
from the IAEA PRIS database (International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), 2014). There is no speciﬁed constraint for the lifetime of
speciﬁc reactors, in part because most of the systems and com-
ponents can and have been replaced one or more times. Reactor1 A very small (60 MWt, 12 MWe) dual-purpose (district heating and elec-
tricity) nuclear plant predates the O1 reactor and was connected to the grid in the
Ågesta suburb of Stockholm in 1964. This reactor was the ﬁrst part of the later
abandoned “Swedish Line” program of natural-uranium fueled heavy-water-mod-
erated reactors that were also meant to serve a role in the Swedish nuclear
weapons program.operators apply for a renewed operational license from the
Swedish Radiation Safety Authority every 10 years, and as long as
it is granted they may continue to operate. An estimation of the
probable lifetime, consistent with the statements of reactor own-
ers and operators, have been made based on the reactor type with
the following results: The ﬁrst generation of BWRs (ABB-1): 50 years,
 The second generation (ABB-II) and smaller third-generation
BWR units (ABB-III, BWR-2500): 60 years
 The larger third generation BWR units (ABB-III, BWR-3000):
60–80 years (60 years was used for all calculations)
 The Westinghouse PWRs: 60 years, except for R2 which has
been designated for a 50-year lifespan (Radio, 2014)
Given Sweden's 10-year review approach to licensing, the de-
cision to decommission (if not forced by political decisions) will
likely not be based on any technological limits but rather on
whether the economic analysis favor decommissioning and full
reactor replacement over that of further upgrades to reactor
components. Sweden has recently performed very extensive up-
grade projects (some which are still on-ongoing) in several re-
actors that involve the replacement of turbines, valves, cables and
control and safety equipment. Thus, rather than being up to 40
years old, much of the equipment in these plants is brand new. The
only components that are typically not subject to upgrade analysis
are the reactor pressure vessel and containment structure, which
are seen as so expensive and difﬁcult replace that a complete re-
actor replacement is preferable. One of the most age-critical
component in the Swedish nuclear ﬂeet is the pressure vessel of
the O1 reactor, which is in good condition according to the reactor
safety experts that periodically examine the vessel and has an
estimated technical lifetime exceeding 60 years (Gärdinge, 2013).
Interesting to note is that while the age of reactors (measured
not in the age or condition of components critical to safety, but as
the time between the present and when the reactor was started)
has received much attention in the media and political debate, no
such attention has been paid to the, for the most part, signiﬁcantly
older hydropower installations that provide the other half of
Swedish electricity.2. Methods
2.1. CO2 emissions impact of the Swedish nuclear program
To estimate the impact that nuclear power has had and will
continue to have on electricity-generation-related CO2 emissions,
the emissions caused by nuclear power need to be compared to
those from competing technologies. Reference values for the life-
cycle emissions of nuclear and competing baseload electricity
generation alternatives are given in Table 2. The life-cycle assess-
ment (LCA) of emissions covers the areas of construction and
dismantling of power plants, fuel production & transport, plant
operations, and handling of residual products and waste. Three
values have been added for nuclear due to the noticeable disparity
of data. The most comprehensive LCA study speciﬁcally for the
Swedish nuclear ﬂeet are the periodic reports of the Swedish
state-owned power producer Vattenfall, which produce LCA-
emissions assessments based on the international ISO 14040 and
ISO 14044 standards (Vattenfall, 2012). Notably, the largely theo-
retically derived values used by the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC Working Group III—Mitigation of Climate
Change, 2014) as well as from a comprehensive review study
(Lenzen, 2008) for global nuclear are 2–10 times higher than those
estimated speciﬁcally for Sweden by Vattenfall based on actual
Table 1
The Swedish Nuclear Reactor Fleet (International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
2014).
Reactor
name
Power
[MW]
Reactor
model
Start of com-
mercial
operation
Estimated
years of
technical
lifetime
Remaining
years of
operation
B1 600 ABB-II 1975-06-01 60 35a
B2 600 1977-06-01 60 32a
O1 492 ABB-I 1972-02-06 50 7
O2 845 ABB-II 1975-01-01 60 20
O3 1450 ABB-III,
BWR-
3000
1985-08-14 60–80 31–51
F1 1022 ABB-III,
BWR-
2500
1980-12-10 60 26
F2 1158 1981-07-07 60 27
F3 1212 ABB-III,
BWR-
3000
1985-08-18 60-80 31–51 (31)
R1 910 ABB-I 1976-01-01 50 11
R2 847 W (3-
loop)
1975-05-01 50 21
R3 1117 1981-09-09 60 27
R4 990 1983-11-21 60 29
a The B1 and B2 reactors were shutdown by political decision after having
operated 24 and 28 calendar years respectively. Since the “aging” of nuclear power
plants is mainly related to their operation (for instance the radiation damage to the
reactor vessel), the remaining years of operation for B1 and B2 is calculated as their
total estimated operating lifetime minus the years they operated (B1:
6024.5¼35.5, B2: 6028¼32).
Table 2
Life-cycle assessment of CO2 emissions from electricity sources.
Electricity source CO2 emissions [g/kWh]
Mean value (range)
Source
Coal 1045 (909–1182) Jaramillo et al. (2007)
Natural gas 602 (386–818)
Nuclear 5 Vattenfall (2012)
12 (3.7–110) IPCC Working Group III—Miti-
gation of Climate Change (2014)
65 (10130) Lenzen (2008)
Table 3
Fossil-fueled electricity production in countries neighboring to Sweden (TWh/year)
(World Bank, 2014).
Country Coal Natural gas Oil Sum
Germany 286.4 70.0 9.5 365.9
Finland 7.4 6.6 0.4 14.4
Denmark 10.6 4.2 0.4 15.2
Poland 136.3 6.1 2.1 144.5
Estonia 10.2 0.1 0.1 10.4
Lithuania ∼0 2.7 0.2 2.9
Latvia ∼0 3.0 ∼0 3.0
Sum 450.9 92.8 12.6 556.3
S.A. Qvist, B.W. Brook / Energy Policy 84 (2015) 1–10 3operational data. However, to remain conservative, we used the
highest mean value of the three references (65 g-CO2/kWh) and
applied this for Swedish nuclear in all calculations in this study.
For this analysis, due to a lack of reliable future projections, we
have assumed that the values as given in Table 2 will remain stable
within the relevant timeframe (∼30 years in to the future). The
future average emission rates for coal will depend on what types
of coal are being used, to what extent co-generation is im-
plemented (for instance for district heating) and the potential
future success of industrial-scale carbon capture and storage
technology. If emissions-reducing technologies are vigorously
supported and pursued in the coming decades, there is a chance
that the value as stated in Table 2 (1045 g-CO2/kWh) will even-
tually represent an overestimation of actual future coal emission
rates.
It is often erroneously stated that if the Swedish nuclear ﬂeet
would be replaced by an equivalent amount renewable power-
generating capacity (if this turned out to be a technical possibility),
the resulting near-zero effective change in the total CO2 emissions
caused by the change in the type of electricity production would
not harm efforts to mitigate climate change. However, such a naïve
analysis misses two key points: (i) If dispatchable (‘baseload’)
power sources are replaced by variable (intermittent) generators,
then system costs will increase disproportionately due to impacts
on frequency control and the additional need for grid extensions,higher reserve capacities (‘overbuild’ of peak generation potential)
and spinning reserve with high ramp rates (typically supplied by
open-cycle gas) (OECD-NEA, 2012); and, most importantly, (ii) The
European national electricity grids are interconnected and in-
tegrated, and all excess electricity produced by nuclear power will
reach a consumer somewhere within the grid(s), given adequate
transfer capacity.
Today there is an annual trade of ∼300 TWh/y (more than
twice the total production of Sweden) in the Nordic/Baltic elec-
tricity-trading network “NordPool” alone (NordPool, 2014).
Building for example new renewable sources in Sweden corre-
sponding to the electricity production of a nuclear plant means
that the nuclear plant, if kept operating beyond that required for
purely domestic demand, is free to replace the production from for
example coal or gas-ﬁred plants within the connected electricity
grids. The current Swedish electricity export capacity is 9750 MW,
6090 MW of which is directly connected to countries with a large
fraction coal production (Germany, Poland, Denmark and Finland),
meaning that in theory (if it was not needed for domestic de-
mand), two thirds of the nuclear power could already be exported
to displace coal even without transmission capacity expansions
(Swedish National Grid, 2014). The fossil-fueled electricity pro-
duction in the countries neighboring to Sweden is summarized in
Table 3. There is a total of 556 TWh/y of fossil-fueled electricity
production in the surrounding area, 81% of which (451 TWh/y) is
derived from the burning of coal (World Bank, 2014). The Swedish
nuclear ﬂeet would therefore have to be replaced about ten times
over by new renewables production (then completely displacing
fossil fuels in the nearby grids) before the argument can be validly
made that there is no potential to prevent emissions by continued
nuclear electricity production in Sweden. The Swedish nuclear
ﬂeet is an already built, tested, proﬁtable and well operating
low-CO2 electricity production machine with an exceptional safety
track record that is capable of supplying up to 80 TWh/year of
electricity (at 90% capacity factor with all reactors operational).
Not allowing it to operate by political decision is from a climate
impact perspective equivalent to building a new renewable re-
source and then deciding not to connect it to the grid. This impact
is exactly the same even if an equivalent amount of low-CO2
production is built as a “replacement” for the lost nuclear capacity
(even if the replacement is new nuclear), as long as any fossil-
fueled production remains on the grid.
The current production cost structure of electricity in the
Nordic/Baltic and northern European market means that Swedish
nuclear electricity production is directly coupled to the production
from coal; that is, a decrease in nuclear production results in an
equivalent increase in the production from coal, and vice versa
(NordPool, 2014). To assess the impact on CO2 emissions (and in
the following section, impacts on health) of current and future
Swedish nuclear electricity production, three scenarios were
modeled here:
Table 5
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Potential future tax revenue of nuclear power in Sweden (Swedenergy, 2014).2. Nuclear is replaced by (or replaces) 90% coal and 10% natural
gas
Factor Cost Potential future tax revenue3.
Energy consumption tax 0.29 SEK/kWh 609 b SEK (92 b USD)
Effect tax (current level) 12648 SEK/MWt 118 b SEK(18 b USD)
Property tax 0.03 (SEK/kWh) 63 b SEK (9.5 b USD)
Sum taxes 790 b SEK (120 b USD)
Table 6
Prevented CO2 emissions (current and future) by Swedish nuclear (based on
emissions factors given in Table 2).
Reactor Prevented CO2 emissions vs. replacement technology mix (mil-
lion tonnes)
100% coal 90% coal, 10% NG 80% coal, 20% NG
To-date Future To-date Future To-date Future
B1 77 151 74 144 71 138
B2 106 136 102 131 97 125
O1 98 20 94 19 90 18
O2 151 120 145 115 139 110
O3 222 327 213 314 204 300Nuclear is replaced by (or replaces) 80% coal and 20% natural
gas
For this analysis, all reactors are assumed to continue to oper-
ate for the rest of their technological lifespans (Table 1) at their
individual lifetime integrated capacity factors (up to 2013) as re-
ported to the Power Reactor Information System (PRIS) (Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2014). Using the values of
Table 2, the potential difference in CO2-emissions (per kWh of
electricity produced) by not allowing the Swedish nuclear reactor
ﬂeet to operate is calculated as:
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥x xEmissions 1045 602 65
g
kWh 1
1 2Δ = * + * − ( )
Where x1 and x2 is the fraction of coal and natural gas that
nuclear could be displacing respectively (x1þx2¼1), and constants
are the respective emissions factors by energy source. The results
are summarized in Section 3.1.
2.2. Health and safety
The production of energy and electricity does not only impact
the long-term climate through the release of greenhouse gases but
also directly impacts human health due to, for instance, particulate
and heavy-metal air pollution from fossil plants or harmful doses
of radioactivity in the event of severe nuclear accidents. The
mortality factors for the relevant electricity sources in this study
per TWh of electricity produced are summarized in Table 4. The
factors are based on analysis for Europe and represent the sum of
accidental deaths and air pollution-related effects in Table 2 of ref.
(Markandya and Wilkinson, 2007). The mortality factor for coal is
the mean of the factors for lignite and hard coal in ref. (Markandya
and Wilkinson, 2007). Even though there have been no reported
deaths from the operation of Swedish nuclear plants to date, the
calculations assume a non-zero mortality rate of nuclear as given
in Table 4 for both past and future nuclear operation. Using this
information, the impact of a nuclear phase-out on the number of
deaths stemming from electricity production can be conservatively
estimated in much the same way as emissions in the previous
section. Using the values of Table 4, the potential difference in
energy-related-deaths by not allowing the Swedish nuclear re-
actor ﬂeet to operate is calculated as:
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥x xFatalities 28.67 2.821 0.074
Deaths
TWh 2
1 2Δ = * + * − ( )
Where x1 and x2 is the fraction of coal and natural gas that
nuclear could be displacing respectively (x1þx2¼1), and constants
are the respective death rates by energy source.The results are
summarized in Section 3.2.
2.3. Direct economic impacts
Beyond climate and health implications, the new proposedTable 4
Mortality factors of different electricity sources
(Markandya and Wilkinson, 2007).
Electricity source Deaths/TWh, mean (range)
Coal (excl. China) 28.67 (7.15–114)
Natural gas 2.821 (0.7–11.2)
Nuclear 0.074 (range not given)policy has potentially severe economic implications. Estimating
the overall impact on the total Swedish economy and industrial
production as a result of a premature shutdown of the technology
that currently supplies over 40% of its electricity involves a com-
plex suite of interactions and dependences that is beyond the
scope of this paper and would require a much more thorough
analysis. SKGS, the organization representing Swedish basic in-
dustry (which employs 400,000 Swedes and accounts for a large
fraction of Swedish export income), reports that the future of
Swedish industry is under severe threat if the current ﬂeet of
nuclear power plants is not replaced by new nuclear capacity ra-
ther than intermittent weather-dependent electricity sources once
its reaches its technical lifetime limits (Axelsson, 2014). The im-
pacts of a premature decommissioning without any coherent plan
for replacement capacity are naturally far more severe.
The plentiful hydropower resources along with the remarkable
success of the Swedish nuclear program led to electricity pro-
duction costs that are among the lowest in the world. As a result,
Sweden has a special niche in world trade because its exports tend
to highly energy-intensive (Nordhaus, 1997). Rising energy costs in
Sweden is thus likely to hurt the overall economy to a greater
extent than most other countries (Table 5).
Any replacement capacity that is built will need to recover
costs by either by direct rate increases or indirectly from sub-
sidized, in the end both paid for by Swedish consumers and
companies, but the costs of building replacement capacity is just a
small fraction of the total cost (also counted as loss of potential
income) of a premature decommissioning.
In this section, we only study some direct and immediate
economic impacts that can easily be calculated to give at least a
lower bound to total costs. However, we will make no attempt to
calculate the costs associated with any replacement of this pro-
duction capacity. The remaining production potential of theF1 223 206 214 197 205 189
F2 215 238 206 228 197 218
F3 239 292 230 280 220 268
R1 177 66 170 64 162 61
R2 189 59 181 56 173 54
R3 201 218 193 209 184 200
R4 192 217 184 208 176 199
Sum 2090 2049 2004 1965 1918 1880
Sum excl.
B1–B2
2090 1762 2004 1690 1918 1617
Table 7
Potential prevented deaths (current and future) by Swedish nuclear using the mean
mortality factors from Table 4.
Reactor Prevented deaths vs. replacement technology mix
100% coal 90% coal, 10% NG 80% coal, 20% NG
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1800 TWh without it. The direct costs for the state, in the form of
lost future tax revenues, can be estimated in a simpliﬁed way
using the taxation levels for nuclear power of Table 5, assuming
that the Barsebäck plant would be restarted. The results are
summarized in Section 4.3.To-date Future To-date Future To-date Future
B1 2259 4394 2054 3997 1850 3600
B2 3090 3976 2810 3616 2531 3257
O1 2850 578 2592 526 2335 474
O2 4404 3498 4006 3181 3608 2865
O3 6487 9543 5901 8681 5314 7818
F1 6515 6009 5926 5466 5337 4922
F2 6264 6934 5698 6307 5132 5680
F3 6985 8514 6354 7745 5723 6975
R1 5161 1940 4695 1765 4228 1589
R2 5515 1709 5017 1555 4518 1400
R3 5858 6370 5329 5794 4799 5219
R4 5608 6324 5101 5752 4594 5181
Sum 60,995 59,790 55,482 54,385 49,968 49,960
Sum excl. B1–B2 60,995 51,419 55,482 46,771 49,968 42,1233. Results
3.1. Impacts on CO2 emissions
The calculated prevention of CO2 emissions (the difference
between emissions caused by the reactors and the emissions
caused by the equivalent production from the energy mixes listed
above) is summarized in Table 6.
It is clear that the current Swedish nuclear program as a whole
has just recently reached past its halfway point of production. The
results show that the reactors have the potential of preventing
about 1.9–2.1 gigatonnes (Gt) of future CO2-emissions if allowed to
operate their full technological lifespans. This corresponds to over
30 times the total current annual Swedish CO2 emissions from all
sources (including transportation) (International Energy Agency,
2013).
From a climate perspective alone, not allowing the Swedish
reactors to operate by political decision (whether it is by a mor-
atorium or by taxing it out of operation) is equivalent to deciding
to disconnect all of Germanys operating wind and solar plants
from the grid (combined production of 76.9 TWh/y in 2013)
(Burger, 2013).2
There is a large disparity in the remaining potential for pro-
duction and corresponding emissions-prevention of different re-
actors. The least-utilized reactor (as a fraction of its total possible
production), Barsebäck-1 (B1), was decommissioned prematurely
(by political ﬁat in 1999) when it had reached about 1/3 of its full
production potential. If the B1 reactor had instead been allowed to
displace a corresponding amount of coal power production in
nearby Denmark and Germany, an average of 10700 t of CO2
emissions per day would have been prevented. Integrated through
to October 2014, the lost prevented emissions stemming from the
shutdown of B1 alone are close to the total annual CO2 emissions
from all sources in Sweden. To date, the premature decom-
missioning of the B1 and B2 reactors have meant the lost oppor-
tunity to prevent an estimated 94.4 million tonnes of CO2 emis-
sions. If B1-B2 were restarted (or had not been shutdown), the
total prevented CO2-emissions the reactors could have achieved is
around 265 Mt (the equivalent of 4.5 years of current total
Swedish CO2 emissions from all sources).
The units with the least relative and absolute production that
remain in operation are the O1, R1 and R2 reactors. O1, the
smallest and oldest of the Swedish power reactors, has already
produced over 80% of its potential lifetime production. The re-
maining CO2-emission-prevention potential of the O1 reactor is
∼20 Mt, equivalent to the total emissions from the transport sector
of Sweden during one year. On the other side of the scale, the
newer and larger units such as the O3 (the world's most powerful
BWR) and F3 have, individually, about twice the remaining pro-
duction capability of all the smaller reactors (O1, R1, R2) combined.
Thus, an early decommissioning of any of these large and high-
capacity units will obviously have a much larger impact. The
complete historical and future potential emissions prevention of2 The main differences being that Swedish nuclear power provides baseload
power and bears its own costs (plus additional special taxes for nuclear) while the
German wind and solar plants are intermittent and heavily supported by subsidies.the Swedish nuclear reactors, assuming nuclear is displacing 100%
coal and vice versa, is illustrated in Fig. 1.
3.2. Health impacts of phasing out nuclear power in Sweden
The results for the prevented deaths by nuclear power pro-
duction (current and future) in Sweden are summarized by reactor
unit in Table 7.
In total, through to October 2014, Swedish nuclear power
production has prevented an estimated 50,000–60,000 deaths as
compared to what would have occurred if fossil-based alternatives
were used in its place. The potential for future prevention of death
is also 50,000–60,000, which gives a total estimated potential
energy-related death prevention by the Swedish nuclear program
(if allowed to run its technological course) of 100,000–120,000
lives.
If used to replace coal production, the individual Swedish re-
actors have the potential of preventing anywhere from 80 (O1) up
to 318 (O3) deaths per year for the rest of their operational life. The
to-date and future potential death prevention of the Swedish
nuclear reactors, assuming nuclear is displacing 100% coal and vice
versa, is shown in Fig. 2.
These values and the methodology with which they were cal-
culated match well with those of the large European Commission
study on the external costs of electricity production (ExternE),
which estimates an increased energy-production-related death
toll of ∼200 lives/year as a direct consequence of the premature
shutdown of the Barsebäck plant (European Commission, 1999).
Using the ExternE reference values, the premature shutdown of
the Barsebäck plant has caused an estimated 2400 deaths to date
from air pollution caused primarily by fossil power production in
nearby Denmark and Germany, which could have been avoided.
Denmark operates a major coal plant and several large natural gas
plants less than 30 km from the Barsebäck site. The decision to
shut down the Barsebäck plant thus stands out as the policy de-
cision with by far the most serious negative energy-production-
related health and climate effects in the history of energy pro-
duction in the Nordic countries.
The safety track record of both Swedish hydro and nuclear
power is exceptional, and far exceeds that of all other comparable
major industrial activities as well as the transportation sector (The
Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare, 2013). It is very
difﬁcult to ﬁnd any data to support the high level of political and
activist group concern about the safety of Swedish energy
Fig. 2. Maximum potential deaths prevented by Swedish nuclear reactors. Note that reactors B1/B1 were shutdown prematurely.
Fig. 1. Maximum prevention potential for greenhouse gas emissions of the Swedish reactors (million tonnes of CO2).
S.A. Qvist, B.W. Brook / Energy Policy 84 (2015) 1–106installations as compared to other industrial activities, suggesting
that at least part of the concern stems from misinformation. There
have been no accidents resulting in an impact on the environment
or people in the history of Swedish nuclear power (the most se-
vere incident is ranked as a 2 on the INES scale (International
Atomic Energy Agency, 2008), but there have been several hy-
dropower dam breaks. In 1973, the dam failure near the town of
Sysslebäck in Värmland County resulted in the death of a 47-year
old woman and the destruction of a number of residential homes
(Lönnroth, 1979). The much larger break at the Noppikoski dam in
1985 released about one million m3 of water and destroyed several
roads and bridges, but fortunately did not result in any fatalities
(County Council of Dalarna, 2012). In the summer of 2000, a large
dam failure at the Aitik mine could have had serious con-
sequences, but since the downstream dam did not fail, the con-
sequences were limited to material damage. More recently, two
hydropower dam failures in 2010 destroyed roads and nearby
buildings but did not result in any fatalities (The Government of
Sweden, 2012).
A commonly held belief is that while nuclear power is statis-
tically among the safest large-scale electricity production tech-
nologies, a severe accident in a nuclear facility has much larger
consequences than accidents/events for competing technologies
such as hydro or fossil power. This is not supported by either local
Swedish or international experience and modeling. The failure of
the Banqiao Reservoir Dam (and the resulting failures of down-
stream dams) in China in 1975 remains the most severe energy-production-related accident in history, resulting in the loss of as
many as 230,000 lives and the collapse of 6 million buildings, di-
rectly affecting the lives of 11 million people (Graham, 1999). The
April 1986 Chernobyl accident is the world's only source of fatal-
ities from nuclear power plant radiation fallout to date. According
to the latest assessment by the United Nations Scientiﬁc Com-
mittee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), 43 deaths
are conclusively attributable to radiation from Chernobyl as of
2006 (28 were plant staff/ﬁrst responders and 15 were from the
6000 diagnosed cases of thyroid cancer) (United Nations Scientiﬁc
Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, 2008). An earlier
study using the conservative linear non-threshold model for the
biological effects of ionizing radiation by the Chernobyl Forum, a
group of nine United Nations agencies, estimated that a total of up
to 4000 people could eventually die of radiation exposure due to
the Chernobyl accident (UN Chernobyl Forum, 2006).
While accidents in Swedish electricity production have caused
only a single fatality (in the hydropower accident of 1973), avail-
able modeling results suggest a similar relation as that mentioned
above between the potential consequences of Swedish hydro and
nuclear power accidents. For example, the Suorva dam that reg-
ulates the Akkajuare reservoir in northern Sweden connects to the
Lule River, which ﬂows through the cities of Boden and Luleå with
a combined population of 65,000. A failure in the dam, releasing
some fraction of the six billion m3 of water in the reservoir (over
ten times the volume of the Banqiao Reservoir) would result in the
complete destruction of the cities of Boden and Luleå, as well as
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(Suorva är ingen lyckad konstruktion (Interview with Peter Stedt
of Vattenfall AB), 2014).3 In addition to Suorva, failures in other
critical dam facilities such as the Trängslet dam on the Dalälven
River would strike cities such as Mora and Orsa with combined
population that exceeds 15,000.
In comparison, according to the ﬁnal report of the Swedish
Energy Commission of 1994, a very severe accident in the Barse-
bäck plant (which is located close to the major cities of Malmö,
Sweden and Copenhagen, Denmark) could potentially lead to 100–
500 fatalities in Europe over the next 50 years, assuming that ra-
diation ﬁlters are not working at their design efﬁciency and, for
the higher value of 500 deaths, weather patterns are the least
favorable possible (Swedish Energy Commision, 1994). The health
impact of the decommissioning of the Barsebäck plant, using the
ExternE numbers, is thus already equivalent to that of the esti-
mated impacts of up to 15 very severe accidents in the Barsebäck
reactors (of course in reality the plant could not suffer more than
one severe accident before being shut down).
The probability of failure for any of the 20 major Swedish dams
that could have very serious consequences is estimated as 0.002,
or 1 failure in 500 years (Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency,
2012). The likelihood of dam break in a safety-critical facility
(which inevitably will have external consequences) is therefore at
least four times higher than the estimated likelihood of an event
causing core damage in any Swedish nuclear plant4 (a type of
event which, outside of the Chernobyl accident, has never caused a
fatality in the history of commercial nuclear power).
Swedish nuclear power is regulated in the speciﬁc law of nu-
clear installations (Swedish Law 1983:3), the radiation protection
law (1988:220) and general environmental law (“Miljöbalken”),
with construction and operation at all times subject to the ap-
proval of the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority. The laws and
nuclear safety requirements are extensive and deal not only with
technical matters but also with issues such as emergency plan-
ning, organization development, administration and training. In
contrast, the concept of hydropower dam safety is not clearly
deﬁned in Swedish law and there does not exist a speciﬁc law or
authority for its governance (or for any other electricity source
except nuclear) (Idenfors et al., 2012), but some regulations re-
garding the dams are included in the general water and emer-
gency rescue laws (1983:291, 1986:1102).
Similarly, there are no deﬁned insurance requirements for the
very large and safety-critical hydropower dams, while the nuclear
plants are subject to strict regulation on required reserves (to be
immediately available for compensation at the moment of an ac-
cident) as well as total liability in the case of an accident. Para-
doxically, the insurance issue has often been raised by the ideo-
logical opponents of nuclear power as a form of “hidden subsidy”,
since it is not possible for any single company to completely insure
against the worst conceivable nuclear accident scenarios. The
same is of course true for a large number of the Swedish hydro-
power dams, oil storage tanks near cities, any type of transport of
dangerous materials, passenger ferries and cruise ships, air trafﬁc,
oil and gas platforms, chemical industries, water treatment and3 The Suorva Dam was initially constructed inside of a national park in 1919–
1923 and subsequently extended three times, most recently in 1966–1972 (con-
current with the construction of the O1 reactor). In the morning of the 4th of
October 1983, Mr. John Tomma (a local member of the Sami people, not afﬁliated
with the operation of the dam) discovers a leak in the dam, the ﬂow from which
threatens his outhouse. Mr. Tomma alerted authorities at Vattenfall (the owner and
operator of the dam), whose experts spent a full week searching for the cause of
the leak before ﬁnding and stopping it (Bjurholt and Gustafsson, 2004).
4 Calculated using the values quoted for the core damage frequency of current
US nuclear plants (Swedish data was not found in open literature) from the World
Nuclear Association (2014).distribution systems, any large sporting event or concert and nu-
merous other activities which may (with low probability of oc-
currence) cause accidents far larger than could be insured against
(Radetzki and Radetzki, 1997). The insurance and reserve re-
quirements levied on the Swedish nuclear industry are unique
among comparable industries and similar requirements are cur-
rently not imposed on other energy production technologies.
Thus it appears from all available data that if one would aim to
reduce accidental deaths and environmental pollution from in-
dustrial activity, the already highly safe and clean Swedish energy-
production sector (whether it be hydro or nuclear) should be very
far down the list of priorities. If one despite this would still choose
to focus political and economical resources on this issue, the ﬁrst
objective should be to increase safety and regulation of hydro-
power installations rather than the already tightly regulated nu-
clear installations.
The health and environmental impacts of hydro and nuclear
power in Sweden, properly accounting for the non-zero prob-
ability of accidents in either technology, is near-negligible com-
pared to all available large-scale baseload power sources that they
are able to displace by continuing to operate (European Commis-
sion, 1999). Thus, any imposed regulation that raises the relative
price of electricity from either nuclear or hydro compared to these
alternatives will have a strong negative overall health and en-
vironmental impact. As described earlier, none of these facts are
altered in any way by a potential replacement of Swedish nuclear
and hydropower by relatively safe and environmentally friendly
intermittent sources such as wind and solar power (if this was to
be technically possible to do without fossil-fuel backup).
3.3. Direct economic (tax revenue) impacts
Assuming current tax levels remain in place, the remaining
production potential of the Swedish nuclear ﬂeet has the potential
to provide nearly 800 billion Swedish kronor (SEK; 120 billion
USD) of direct future tax revenue potential (at current tax levels,
not including potential tax on the proﬁt of utilities), the bulk of
future operating income from current nuclear power plants is also
effectively a direct gain for the state since the Forsmark and
Ringhals plants are majority-owned by the state utility Vattenfall.
Assuming an annual discount rate of 5%, the net present value of
the potential remaining tax revenue over the next 30 years is ∼400
billion Swedish kronor (SEK; 60 billion USD).
An additional tax of 0.022 SEK/kWh (46 billion SEK future po-
tential) is levied on the reactors to ﬁnance the nuclear waste re-
pository, which is not included in the future tax revenue potential
since costs related to the waste repository (which has to be built
either way) would be lower if the plants were to be shutdown
prematurely. The total future spending needed for the repository
program is estimated at 99billion SEK, out of which 49billion SEK
is already available in the repository fund. About half of all re-
maining costs are in some direct way related to the amount of
future nuclear waste produced and could therefore be reduced by
some fraction by an early decommissioning of the nuclear ﬂeet.
Even using the most optimistic assumptions, early decom-
missioning leaves the required repository program signiﬁcantly
underfunded (SKB—Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management
Co, 2013).
3.4. A hypothetical nuclear phase-out by 2022
In this section, we analyze a potential phase-out of Swedish
nuclear analogous to that announced for the German En-
ergiewende (German Federal Ministry for Economy and Technol-
ogy, and Federal Ministry for Environment, Conservation, and
Reactor Safety, 2010), meaning no more nuclear production by
Fig. 3. Example of a planned phase-out of Swedish nuclear by 2022.
S.A. Qvist, B.W. Brook / Energy Policy 84 (2015) 1–1082022. It would seem that the least environmentally and econom-
ically damaging strategy to phase-out nuclear would be to run all
plants up until 2022 and then simultaneously shut them all down
to meet the phase-out target, but it is highly unlikely that such a
strategy would be pursued in reality. More likely, a sequential
shutdown starting with the smallest and oldest reactors would be
implemented, similar to what is planned for Germany. As noted in
the Introduction, the Swedish minister for the environment &
climate has already proposed the ﬁrst step of such a strategy,
starting with the decommissioning of the O1 and R1 reactors
within the next four years (before 2018). However, once draconian
tax measures have been imposed to force the ﬁrst units in to de-
commissioning, it is unlikely that utilities will decide to continue
operating nominally more proﬁtable reactors at next-to-no proﬁt.
Most certainly, no investments of consequence for replacement
parts, upgrades or improved operational performance and safety
would conceivably be carried out at any reactor once such policies
are put in place by the government.
Because of these factors, it is quite difﬁcult to anticipate at what
rate a purely diminishing-proﬁts-driven decommissioning would
occur. In this sense, it would in fact be preferable to have a set
timeline for the decommissioning of certain units that is not en-
tirely determined by their economic performance. If the decom-
missioning is carried out on a predetermined time and production
schedule (as in Germany), there is a chance that adequate capacity
for the import of natural gas and other fossil-fueled baseload
power (including the construction of new transmissions lines) to
cover the loss of production could be made while limiting black-
outs and extreme increases in energy costs for consumers.
Despite these uncertainties, for the purpose of analyzing the
impact of a phase-out of Swedish nuclear by 2022, below we
present a hypothetical sequential phase-out plan based on the
proﬁtability, size and age of reactors. The plan, shown in Fig. 3, is
unlikely to represent an optimal or even probable phase-out plan,
but in the absence of any speciﬁc schedule it serves well to ap-
proximate the likely impacts of any such plan regardless of the
speciﬁc details.
The phase-out plan as shown in Fig. 3 includes about 340 TWh
of remaining production in the Swedish nuclear ﬂeet, or 16% of its
remaining technological potential. Rather than utilizing the full
potential of preventing roughly 2 billion tonnes of CO2, the 2022
phase-out plan has the potential for nuclear to prevent about 330
million tons CO2. Notably, the difference of ∼1700 million tonnes
of unprevented CO2 emissions corresponds to the estimated
emissions by all sources in Sweden until the year 2040 (if current
rates remain unchanged).The direct loss of tax revenue for the state (disregarding tax on
utility proﬁt and the direct income from state-owned reactors) is
on the order of 660 billion SEK (100 billion USD). The lost potential
to displace coal also reduces the potential for preventing energy-
related deaths by ∼50,000 lives (from 10,000 to 60,000).4. Discussion
In any modern industrial society, the combination of electricity
production technologies and available import/export capacity
must match power demand on the national grid at every moment
throughout the year to maintain grid frequency and avoid black-
outs. This challenge is currently met in Sweden primarily through
the regulated power output of fast-response hydropower, which
operates on top of the baseload production by nuclear. Sweden has
already expanded hydropower to its maximum production po-
tential since the remaining untouched major rivers (Kalix älv,
Torne älv, Piteälven, Vindelälven and 15 other rivers and river
sections) are protected from installations by Swedish law. Hydro-
power cannot be expanded to replace any of the lost capacity as
nuclear is phased out or to regulate any large-scale installation of
intermittent power.
While the plans for a nuclear phase-out have already reached
the initiating stages (and the Barsebäck plant has already been
prematurely shut down), no plans have been put forth to explain
what will be replacing the lost capacity. Sweden has a rapidly
increasing population, a large and successful heavy industry sector
and a climate-driven push toward the electriﬁcation of the entire
transport sector, which means there is very little room for a de-
crease in the total electricity demand over the coming decades. For
example, the energy use for domestic transport (which is
currently 493% fossil-fueled) is around 86 TWh/y, larger than the
total production capacity of either nuclear or hydropower
(Swedish Energy Agency, 2014). Because of the superior efﬁciency
of modern electrical and hybrid vehicles compared to combustion
engines, the total required energy is most likely lower than this
but still very substantial.
The only major government-driven plan for new electricity
production that is currently being pursued is a heavily subsidized
push toward 30 TWh/y of wind power by 2020 (up from ∼10 TWh/
y in 2013/2014) (Swedish Government, 2014). This political deci-
sion has been taken without a clearly deﬁned motivation (other
than referring to other political decisions requiring 49% “renew-
able” energy by 2020), determined budget or published feasibility
and consequence study, and appears to have no direct link to the
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The installation of a large fraction of intermittent sources re-
quires a correspondingly expanded regulation/backup capacity.
According to the Swedish grid operator (Svenska Kraftnät), the
Swedish Energy Agency (Energimyndigheten) and the Royal
Swedish Academy of Sciences, there is no room for expansion of
the current regulation capacity of Swedish hydropower (Swedish
National Grid, 2008) (The Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering
Sciences, 2002) (Swedish Energy Agency, 2008). Indeed, it has
been shown that if the current hydropower system is, in the fu-
ture, regulated more actively to match wind power variability, it
could have devastating effects on the local environment (The Royal
Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences, 2002). The Swedish
grid operator estimates an increased need for regulating power of
4.35.3 GW for an additional installation of 12 GW of wind power
(corresponding to 30 TWh/year of total Swedish wind power)
(Swedish National Grid, 2008), without factoring in the potential
loss of nearly 10 GW of available baseload power from a nuclear
phase-out. It therefore appears highly unlikely that 30 TWh/year
of intermittent wind power, for which there is no existing or
proposed regulation power, would be able to replace 60–70 TWh/
year of baseload power from nuclear successfully.
The current Swedish wind power installations reach a com-
bined yearly minimum of a ∼0.3% of the installed power averaged
over one hour. For example, on an hourly-basis, a potential future
12,000 MW Swedish wind power ﬂeet using the current reliability
ﬁgures can relied upon to produce about 36 MW of power at any
given hour of the year. The power level that could be maintained
90% of the hours in the year is estimated at ∼6% of the installed
capacity. Since wind power has no impact on the effect balance of
current Swedish electricity supply, the grid operator has gener-
ously assigned the assured power from wind sources at 6% (nu-
clear is at 90%) (Swedish National Grid, 2014).
The impact on the effect-balance of the grid by the difference in
assured power when exchanging nuclear production by wind
power is profound. The peak estimated power demand for a cold
winter in Sweden is 28,200 MW, for which the total current as-
sured power production capability is an adequate match (Swedish
National Grid, 2014). Since the timing and severity of the peak
power demand depends primarily on the temperature, peak
power demand typically coincides in northern Europe, leaving
little to none assured import capacity (estimated as 0350 MW by
the Swedish National Grid Operator (Swedish National Grid, 2014).
No coherent explanation or plan for how to replace the loss of
9 GW of assured power supply from the nuclear ﬂeet (the current
nuclear ﬂeet at 90% capacity factor), every watt of which is needed
during cold winter days, has been put forward by the proponents
of a nuclear phase-out.5. Conclusions and policy implications
We have presented a systematic appraisal of the probable di-
rect effects and policy implications of a premature retirement of
the Swedish nuclear ﬂeet, based on the best available data on
energy-related emissions, pollutants and infrastructural costs. The
conclusions are stark and concerning, in terms of the combination
of health, environmental and economic impacts. Given that no
plausible alternative energy plan has been mapped out by pro-
ponents of the nuclear phase-out policy, and faced with the in-
herent daily and seasonal limitations on wind and solar energy in
Scandinavia, it appears virtually certain that the bulk of the
missing electricity supply will be met by some combination of
imported fossil fuels and new combustion-based power plants.
This will compromise the Swedish Government's policy to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions by 40% by 2020 (Government ofSweden, 2014) and seriously undermine any long-term mitigation
goals.
Our analysis reveals that a ‘no nuclear’ decision, in enacted as a
formal Government policy, would be expected to lead to tens
thousands of untimely deaths, billions of tonnes of additional cli-
mate-changing greenhouse gases emitted, and over a hundred
billion dollars in lost revenue for Sweden, compared to the ‘de-
fault’ position of simply allowing the reactor ﬂeet to operate over
its potential lifetime. Beyond its national implications, a nuclear
phase-out policy might encourage other countries to copy Swe-
den's lead in energy policy, which would have serious global en-
vironmental and health implications. Given the urgency with
which the world economy must decarbonize to avoid dangerous
climate change, such a policy runs completely counter to the re-
cent United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, as espoused in
Rioþ20 (United Nations, 2014), and ought to be opposed on the
grounds of international obligations to future human welfare.Acknowledgments
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